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Mine Awareness: 
A New Approach 
The proper integration of mine awareness, Level1 and 2 surveys, and EOD 
can produce a synergistic effect that would benefit everyone involved in a 
mine action program. This concept has been used before but needs to be 
more widely utilized. 
by Michael Labon, 
Independent Consultant 
Introduction 
Normally, all aspects of M ine Aware-
ness (MA) are conducted in parallel wi th, 
but often separate from, Survey and 
Clearance. In addition, Level I Survey 
offi cially precedes Level 2 Survey. And 
Finally, Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD) is often done during Level2 Sur-
vey, but may also be conducted by a stand 
alone resource. T here are good and his-
torical reasons for these being indepen-
dent and/o r linear funct io ns; however, ir 
does lead to gaps in the overall solu tion 
to the mine and UXO threat. 
The concept involves marrying of-
ten independenr and linear components 
into one operation, to create a cycle of 
feedback and incentive, producing an 
operation with synergy that gives greater 
benefi ts to beneficiaries with equal do-
nor resources. T he concept is that (Com-
munity) MA, Level I Survey, Level 2 
Survey and EOD are most effectively and 
efficiently utilized when combined into 
a unified operation. When properly done, 
this produces a synergy that will lead to 
direct benefits for the recipients, donors 
and practitioners. When the components 
are combined into an information and 
activity cycle, they wi ll produce better in-
formation and berrer plans and therefore 
more safety for rhe beneficiaries and more 
precisely directed resources. 
Reasons for Changes-
Desk Experience 
The problem of mines and UXO is 
mulri- facered. The solution is simple: re-
move all the mines and UXO, sort our 
the victims and produce no more devices. 
The problem with rhat, however, is rhar 
rhe resources ava ilable to do rhis are not 
equal to the task. They fal l far short, in fact. 
lr is imperative, then, that solu tions 
take into account rhis shortage of re-
sources when they are developed. Solu-
tions musr be crafted and execu ted in 
such a way rhar maximum benefit is given 
to the people o n the receiving end. Any 
solution rhar does nor rake into account 
the most efficient utilization of resources, 
any p lan rhat does not take into account 
the ultimate end use of every penny or 
rhe impact of every resource input, is less 
than a proper so lution. To this end, as-
pects of rwo of the four pillars-MA and 
Mine Su rvey and C learance- can be 
combined to give a greater impact for 
resou rces spent. 
Because there are and wi ll be insuf-
ficient resources available, rhe approach 
to rhe p roblem is moving from a clear-
ance based solution (take them all away), 
to a management solution (clear the vital 
stu ff and give rhe community the ability 
to live/work alongside the threat). For ex-
ample, we know rhar there are mine Fields 
in Denmark from WWli, but life and the 
economy conti nue. While Z imbabwe 
may have more mines than Mozambique, 
the Zimbabwe border mine Fields pro-
duce fewer casualties in terms of people, 
animals, lifestyles, ere. than the scattered 
and unknown mine and UXO threat in 
neighboring Mozambique. 
C learl y, coping mechanisms exist 
and can be used with great effect. The 
important parr of rhe management solu-
tion is getting the right information so 
rhar the viral locations can be cleared, and 
producing the right information/abilities 
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to allow the community to get on with life. 
Reasons for Changes -
Field Experience 
How A1A got into Survey 
Most of this experience comes from 
conducting mine action operations in 
central Mozambique, for rhe German 
Development and Cooperation Agency 
(GTZ) from 1994 onwards bur especially 
from 1997 to 1999, for CARE in Kosovo 
in J 999, and especial ly Somaliland in 
2000, whe re rhe closest version to this 
concept was pur on the ground and was 
very successful. 
Initially, during emergency refugee 
repatriation work (GT Z/M ine-Tech) inro 
Mozambique in 1994, it was found rhar 
information gathering was enhanced wi rh 
simple MA lectures. Pur mosr simply, 
when asked if there was a mine rhrear in 
the area, the local people could make no 
comment. When given a simple mine and 
UXO recognition lecture, people sud-
denly recognized the shapes, sizes, col-
ors, etc. and could give Level 1 informa-
tion. This was cont inued through the 
yea rs in to village clearance projects (Sur-
vey, followed by Clearance), and ir was 
then fou nd that the Level 2 Survey ream 
(which included EOD support) were of-
ten given more and better information 
rhar had nor been given to the Level 1 
Survey team. 
Incentive 
Two facrors were involved in the suc-
cess of the Level 2 Survey teams: 
• T he Level 2 Survey took much 
more time, during which the team lived 
near the com munity, interacted with 
them and gained their confidence; and 
• The incentive provided by remov-
ing and destroying things (e.g., UXO), 
but often just harmless bur suspicious 
items, made the people more interactive. 
T hey had not felt motivated to hand in in-
formation previously, just for the sake of 
handing in information. Now, everyone 
could see a benefit in giving information. 
information 
Poor information had two severe 
consequences. First, the lack of knowl-
edge in communities led to casualties 
caused by p eople doing things they 
should nor have done, and going places 
(o r sending their livestock ro places) 
where they should nor have gone. The 
vast majority of casualties I have encoun-
tered, in every mine/UXO risk area I have 
knowledge of except Afghan istan, have 
come from people touchingltampering 
with UXO. This is closely followed by 
people touching or going inro mined areas 
about which rhey knew nothing. Invari -
ably, casual ties arc caused by ignorance 
(ignorance being simply a lack of knowl-
edge). 
Secondly, "min e fields" rhar do nor 
exist but are firmly believed to exist re-
tard progress in rhe same ways known 
mine fields do. T his app lies equally ro 
suspicious devices that are actually car 
parts (Mozambique), old sroves (Kosovo) or 
the grave of a tortoise (Somaliland), all of 
which haired progress in some manner. 
An EOD element will: 
• Respond to threats 
identified in Level 1 Survey. 
• Eliminate some of the 
immediate threat. 
• Provide an incentive. 
Level1 Survey: 
_j 
• Develops information 
on the threat. 
• Gathers socio-
In addition, both of these " informa-
tion fai lures" hamper the external rel ief 
effort. (Hereafter, the term "external" will 
be used to refer to all actors outside of 
rhe benefiting community, be they pro-
fessional, commercial or NGO clearance, 
MA organizations, or aid, development and 
relief agencies, etc.). Suspect areas and 
mine fields that are not known cannot be 
dealt with. This is the smaller problem, 
as invariably, someone in or around the 
commun ity has information on every 
suspect area, and evenruall y this will come 
out. Reasons why this is not shared with 
the rest of the community are numerous. 
The larger problem for the externals 
are the "mine fields" that do not exist. In 
most cases, it takes as long ro clear an area 
with no mines as it does to clear a heavily 
m ined area. The major factor s lowing 
clearance is vegetation coverage. Therefore, 
good information gathering during the 
survey stages can lead to early discrediting 
of suspect areas, which in turn frees resources 
for other tasks. Good information leads to 
a greater impact for the beneficiaries. 
Another problem encountered in the 
field was survey/clearance/EOD activities 
that were nor understood by the commu-
niry. T he most common example of this 
is an external EOD capacity that visits 
an area that contains both mines and 
UXO after a report. The team destroys 
the UXO (often with a loud bang), and 
the local population then bel ieves rhe en-
tire threat is eliminated. However, while 
some devices have been destroyed, a mine 
field remains. The people have nor been 
rold, nor do they understand, the differ-
ence between clearance and EOD tasks, 
and we end up wirh further casualties, a 
crisis of confidence in all survey and clear-
ance activities, and previously cleared ar-
eas becoming suspect areas again. 
How the Concept Works 
As is seen in the diagram, all com-
ponents are interlinked, and ideally, "un -
der one roof", with a common manager 
who is responsible for the entire concept, 
rather than any one component of it. The 
concept may be app lied to a specific area, 
and each componen r strength ened or 
weakened depending on the needs for 
that component. However, every aspect 
is viral and equal ly important. 





• Gives information. 
• Gathers information . 
• Has a res idual effect . 
Level 2 Survey: 
• Verifies the presence of mine fi e lds. l economic information. • Maps the threat (s ize & location) . L • Provides an incentive. • Is open-ended. 
Diagram- A. Jackson, Mine· Tech 
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cation, etc. is a large pillar of Mine Ac-
tion , and in general involves passi ng 
mine/UXO information, in many specific 
forms and for many specific reasons. 
Within this concept, the largest portion 
of MA utilized is that which is given and 
aimed at communities. However, the 
larger MA activities-national/mass me-
dia/education-must remain linked ro 
and be part of the cycle of the operation. 
That is, rhe concept feeds, and is fed/ser-
viced in return by, the larger, MA activities. 
Community MA (CMA) must be 
adapted ro include training and enabling 
in coping mechanisms, the development 
of a community database, and the develop-
ment ofa community information network. 
The community must be able ro conduct 
its own Level l Surveys i.e. updating and 
sharing information. The CMA messages 
must include rhe ongoing activities and 
results of the external's work-i.e. what they 
have found or nor found in their surveys. 
Coping mechanisms, aside from rhe 
database and information network, for 
example, involve how ro access resources 
(firewood, warer, grazing land) when a 
porrion of those resources are cur off due 
ro rhe mine threat. This threat usually af-
fects some more than others. People must 
also be taught how ro cope wi th found 
irems, borh in rhe long term (consider-
ing rhe external aspect of the program will 
eventually end) and in the short rerm 
between EOD visits-usually a marking 
exercise, and hopefully nor a "picking 
them up and throwing them down a dis-
used roiler" exercise. The derived prob-
lems of rhe mine th reat will be immense 
and varied, so copi ng mechanisms must 
be imaginative, and ar best suggested by 
rhe external, because the mechanisms 
must be sustai nable, and for char to hap-
pen, they must come from rhe community. 
There must be two databases: cen-
tral authority and commun ity. Both must 
be fed wirh the same precision and zeal. 
W h ile the externals will be using the cen-
tral database, invariably involving writ-
ten records or more com monly net-
worked computers with ful l color displays 
backed up on COs ere., these have seri-
ous limitations. Primarily, because access 
is virtu all y impossible for most common 
people (especially in mine affected coun-
tries), the central database is as nebulous 
as a space program, and therefore just as 
likely to be supported. The incenrive is nor there. 
The community database is stored 
in rhe heads of the community. lr may 
be backed up by community mapping, 
histOrical timelines and orher participa-
tory techniques, bur is mainly backed up 
by constant discussion and regular inputs. 
It is accessible to all who can ask and lis-
ten, and is readily available to anyone who 
visits the area. 
The information network is rhe sys-
tem whereby all reports (from rhe com-
munity or the externals), coping mecha-
nisms, etc. are processed, so that every-
one in the communi ty database is backed 
up. This is a difficult aspeC[, especially in 
communities where there are less rhan 
two casualties a year (which includes al-
most a ll communities I am pleased to 
say). People get bored. Information gers 
garbled or exaggerated or undervalued or 
some derails rhar are wrong are simply 
passed on, ere. There are also usually good 
reasons why some in the community do 
not talk to others-especially in a post-
conflict situatio n. The community needs 
robe monirored, or checked, ro see if the 
information is gerring through ro allele-
ments and levels. 
The beneftts of having an informa-
tion network, as with coping mechanisms 
and the database, must be understood, 
and rhe community made to understand. 
T he primary reasons for involving the 
community returns to information. If rhe 
community is involved, there will be bet-
ter information coming from the indi-
viduals. The involvement of the commu-
nity leads to berrer priority setting. This 
is furrher enhanced if there is a develop-
mem project linked with the concept. 
Involvement of rhe community in prior-
ity serring also provides an incentive, 
which feeds the information cycle. As 
resources available will nor solve the com-
munities mine problem (hence the for-
marion of th is concept), they must be 
made aware that they will have ro cope. 
Therefore, there must be community par-
ticipation if mine fields are to be left. And 
there wil l a lways be a residual threat, 
much as there is from WW ll in Europe. 
If the community is made aware and 
can see rhar better information leads to 
better utilization of resources and hence 
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increased benefits to the community that 
also feeds the information cycle. It must 
be poimed our rhat benefits range from 
the direct ones-more area cleared, de-
vices removed, bogus m ine fields elimi-
nated without clearance, ere. to the indi-
rect ones-boreholes, clinics, schools, 
roads, agricultural projects; all rhe kinds 
of development work rhar srays away be-
cause externals are afraid of rhe mine threat. 
The incenrive aspect should nor be 
any personal benefit to an individual, but 
rather to rhe community as a whole, and 
rhe incentive must never be money. 
While rhe CMA practitioners will 
invariably also conduct rhe Level 1 Sur-
veys, rhe CMA practitioners must be rhe 
same people as those doing rhe Level 2 
Survey and EOD work. Personnel should 
at best be interchangeable through all 
components, and at least be in rhe same 
organization, eating and sleeping in rhe 
same places (since they are already work-
ing in rhe same places), and be rorally fa-
miliar with how the other components work. 
Survey is rhe gathering of in forma-
tion, therefore; Level 1 Survey is rhe gather-
ing of general information, and Level 2 Sur-
vey is the gathering of technical information. 
Thus, Level 1 Survey can be con-
ducted by anyone who can listen and re-
tain information. Level2 Survey requires 
a M ine Clearance capability ro interna-
tional standards (including medic, am-
bulance, communications, mine detect-
ing equi pment, personal protective 
equipment (PPE), demolition rools, ere.). 
Level I Survey, fo r rhe purpose of 
this article, is not limi ted, nor does ir al-
ways include, the fill ing in of an I MSMA 
Level I Survey Impact fo rm (or any local 
equivalent) . It involves any gathering of 
any information on rhe mine and UXO 
threat, usually based upon: 
• Local In formation (no-go places), 
• Casualties (human, animal and 
vehicles) 
• War History (rhe nature and spe-
cific places on fighting) 
• Specific Informants (people who 
were involved, or were present, during rhe 
mine layinglflghring). 
Level I Survey is never, and can 
never be, finished, o r complete. You can-
nor get all rhe correct information from 
all rhe people the firs t time. There is al-
ways more information out there. A Level 
l Survey exercise can be finished, and can 
be a good foundation for plans, bur rhe 
database must never be closed ro incom-
ing information. 
Level2 Survey involves clearing por-
tions (taking survey samples) of Suspect 
Areas, usually in the form of cleared lanes 
extending into rhe Suspect Area. From 
the information gathered during this op-
eration, which includes mines found , 
blast holes, specific shrapnel or other de-
bris, bodies/bones, ere. the Suspect Area 
should be turned into an area with no 
evidence of a mine field, or a m ine field 
rhar is defined-that is to say, the perim-
eters are marked and mapped. In some 
siruarions, it has been argued that once verifi-
cation is complete, precise boundary mark-
ing should be left as the resources used ro 
do this could be better used on ocher sires. 
EOD provides rhe most dramatic 
incentive, and EOD work involves both 
items being destroyed and removed or 
rendered safe by safe investigation and 
explanation. T he EOD component, like 
all others, must produce feedback. Feed-
back refers to rhe consranr feedback and 
information transfer both ro and from 
communities. This brings them inro rhe 
solution, and provides better informa-
tion. T his in rurn can be used ro sharpen 
the MA component, pur resources imo 
rhe highest priority areas and enhance 
relief or development activities. T hese 
allow better feedback to the communi-
ties in a cycle that will constantly enhance 
information and communi ty safety. 
Benefits 
• Specifically, rhe information flow 
involves the community; therefore, it pro-
duces better prioririzarion. The commu-
nity learns ro manage irs own threat, the 
management is sustainable and socio-eco-
nomic information leads ro better relief 
or development efforts. 
• By providing an immediate action, 
rhe highest rhrear is eliminated (usually 
random UXO), suspect areas are elimi-
nated and the incemive increases com-
munity involvemenr which leads ro bet-
ter information received. 
• The community receives MA in-
formation, and because of consranr feed-
back, the MA training can be upgraded 
and modified ro address and alter spe-
cific dangerous behaviors-rhe classic rea-
sons for casualties. H aving the compo-
nents under one roof makes for a speedier 
response. T here is minimal lag time be-
tween information coming in and a re-
sponse ro ir. 
• Prioritization is done by all stake-
holders (community, developer, mine 
expert, ere), so maximum impact is 
achieved. Suspect areas are eliminated, 
and resources are nor used in unneces-
sary clearance. 
• As the concept employs standard, 
com mon Mine Action components, there 
is no increase in the inpurs or the re-
sources u tilized. The cost therefore does 
nor increase. The change comes in rhe 
employmenr of those resources and com-
ponents. T he consranr cycle of feedback 
and incentive results in rhe most cosr ef-
fective employment of those resources 
rowards the solution ro rhe mine/UXO 
problem. W irh donor fat igue, rh is is in-
creasingly important to communities. 
Conclusion 
The concept can be employed on 
any geographical o r economic scale. It 
may also be used equally in new and old 
rhrear s ituations. One key aspecr will be 
rhe common manager of all the compo-
nents, and rhe area they work in should 
be such char everyone from rhe external 
agency can be fami liar with all of the com-
munity they are dealing with. This will 
depend on rhe rime available, the work 
ro be done (how much is ro be left be-
hind), rhe level of the th reat and rhe den-
siry of rhe population. As all personnel 
involved in the concept should be rea-
sonably interchangeable, no one should 
be underemployed ar any rime. 
The person managing this concept 
m ust be adept, or at the very least, have 
an understanding of all rhe components 
involved, how they operate (with knowl-
edge ofimernarional standards) and how 
rhey are best utilized. This person (the 
practitioner) must also be able ro understand, 
srore and present the information ro all 
concerned, as well as ensure rhar iris used 
within the concept ro maximum benefit. 
The result should be an area where 
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each community has a trained volunteer/ 
facilitator, they have seen some betterment 
of their lives, rhe priority areas (as defined 
by all stakeholders, development and 
community) have been verified and some 
threat has been eliminated, and a reasonably 
accurate picture (database) has been 
formed and this is in the hands of the donors, 
the central authorities and the communities. 
1t should also be noted that a com-
munity need nor be limited ro a rural or 
village community. For example, the 
health working community is also rel-
evant, and can be substituted as "rhe com-
munity" into the concept in all cases. 
They equally need to have coping mecha-
nisms, develop their own rhrear database, 
inform each other of dangers and util ize 
rhe information ro plan clinic develop-
ment, clinic visits, ere. They may also be 
rhe main stakeholder requesting rhe Mine 
Action, and therefore, mosr in need of 
involvement in priority setting. In a com-
mercial setting, the concept can also yield 
dividends. For example, a gas pipeline is 
being built over 400km of mine-threat-
ened country. How does one decide where 
ro clear, what clearance is necessary, ere. ? 
In this respect rhe concept can be equally 
"sold" to the construction company and 
construction workers as one communi ty, 
and by having the project fund CMA, 
EOD work, and Level l and 2 Surveys 
along the projected roure they will ob-
tain rhe best information possible, rhus 
saving casualties or rhei r own money that 
might otherwise go ro unnecessary clear-
ance. This will also benefit the rural com-
munities on the ground and rhe national 
community as a whole. • 
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